Retraining the Unemployed in a Matching Model with Turbulence by Felix Reichling
Retraining the Unemployed in a Matching
Model with Turbulence ¤
Felix Reichling
Stanford University
First Version: February 7, 2005
This Version: March 24, 2005
Abstract
I investigate to what degree differences in retraining opportunities are re-
sponsible for the divergence of unemployment rates between the U.S. and
Europe since the early 1980s. I provide some evidence for higher retraining
rates in the U.S. as compared to Europe and further show that there is tremen-
dous heterogeneity across OECD countries with respect to retraining. In my
model, unemployed workers not only search for jobs but also for suitable re-
training programs. I ﬁnd that when it becomes more difﬁcult to ﬁnd suitable
retraining programs, enrollment rates, productivity and the unemployment
rate decline. Furthermore, this paper is the ﬁrst attempt to investigate the
role of retraining in economies that are subject to economic turbulences as
described by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2004). Using a similar parame-
trization as Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), I ﬁnd that the generosity of unem-
ployment beneﬁts, the main driving force in their model, is not an important
determinant of unemployment, even during tumultuous economic times, if
sufﬁciently good retraining institutions are available. Economies with more
ﬂexible retraining institutions adjust better to economic turbulence, and as a
result, feature lower unemployment rates and higher productivity and output.
My results suggest that differences in retraining opportunities play an impor-
tant role in explaining cross-country differences in unemployment rates.
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11 Introduction
Unemployment in Europe started to emerge as a problem in the early 1980s. For
the prior three decades, the unemployment rate in Europe was considerably lower
than that in the United States. Since 1983, however, Europe has had consistently
higher unemployment rates than the U.S., reaching levels as high as 11 percent
in the early 1990s (see Figure 1). The timing and magnitude of this increase,
however, variesgreatlyacrosscountries. Whilesomecountriesexperiencedasharp
increase in unemployment from the 1970s to the 1980s, others experienced similar
increases only one decade later. Some of the countries that experienced increasing
unemployment rates from the 1970s to the 1980s were able to decrease their rates
signiﬁcantly by the 1990s, while others have not seen any signiﬁcant changes in
their unemployment rates over the last 40 years.
In attempting to explain Europe’s unemployment experience since the 1970s
researchers have focused on three different approaches: the effects of adverse eco-
nomic shocks, the role of labor market institutions, and the interaction between
them (see Bean, 1994, for a survey). Early work using adverse shocks as an ex-
planation includes Blanchard et al. (1986). The authors argue that, among other
factors, a sharp decrease in aggregate demand caused the increase in European un-
employment. However, the strong persistence of the unemployment rates suggests
that this explanation is not sufﬁcient. Other shocks considered in the literature in-
clude technological change, decreasing TFP growth, an increase in the real interest
rate, a shift in labor demand, and oil price shocks (see Blanchard and Wolfers,
2000, for a discussion). While adverse economic shocks are able to explain in-
creases in unemployment rates, most of them affected not only European countries,
but the U.S. as well. The question remains why these shocks would lead to such
different outcomes in the U.S. and Europe.
Another approach focuses on differences in institutions. The main argument
is that European welfare institutions and labor market rigidities are responsible for
creating higher unemployment in Europe by distorting the wage structure, incen-
tives to work and the propensity of ﬁrms to hire workers (see Nickell, 1997, and
Siebert, 1997). Institutions often held responsible for these labor market rigidities
include high levels of employment protection, generous unemployment beneﬁts
combined with long entitlement durations, high tax rates, and extensive union pow-
ers. There are several problems with this approach. Schettkat (2003), for example,
compares the very different experiences of Germany and the Netherlands. Despite
the fact that welfare state institutions in the Netherlands are more generous than
in Germany, the Netherlands, unlike Germany, has experienced a declining unem-
ployment rate since the early 1980s. Schettkat concludes that “differences in the
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Source: OECD Annual Labor Force Statistics, Part II, own calculations.
Figure 1: Unemployment Rates, 1956-2003
employment success” (p. 771).
Another problem with the institutions approach is that of timing. While most
European welfare states have become less generous since the 1970s, unemploy-
ment rates have increased over the same period. It is not obvious why institutions
that once produced very low levels of unemployment now produce so much higher
levels in some countries. Thus, differences in institutions alone cannot explain un-
employment differences between Europe and the U.S. (also see Blanchard, 1999).
The shortcomings of the previous two approaches prompted many researchers
to consider the interaction of economic shocks with institutions. This approach
is attractive because shocks can potentially explain the general increase in unem-
ployment, while differences in institutions can potentially explain differences in
outcomes across countries. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Nunziata (2002) ex-
plore the interaction of institutions with macroeconomic shocks such as a decrease
in TFP growth, an increase in the real interest rate, and a shift in labor demand.
The institutions they consider include unemployment insurance, employment pro-
tection, tax rates, and unionization. Both ﬁnd that these interactions are able to
explain much of the evolution of unemployment across countries and times. How-
ever, their estimated effects do not appear to be very robust (Nunziata, p. 37).
3Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), on the other hand, explore the interaction be-
tween microeconomic shocks and European welfare state institutions. They argue
that the oil price shocks of the 1970s, a shift from manufacturing to services, the
spread of new information technologies, and a decrease in government regulations,
among other factors, have made the economic environment more turbulent since
the 1970s. They focus on the interaction between generous European unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and an increase in economic turbulence, arguing that the European
problem is the result of a supply side response to an increase in economic tur-
bulence. In their model, workers’ wages are determined by their level of human
capital and productivity draws from a common distribution. They model an in-
crease in economic turbulence as an increase in the probability of skill loss upon
layoff. Since workers have no ability to retrain in their economy but receive un-
employment compensation that depends on their last earnings, workers who lose
enough human capital are very unlikely to ever accept another job. The treatment
of human capital is central to their mechanism. While this paper explains the evo-
lution of unemployment differences between Europe and the U.S. extremely well,
the authors use several questionable assumptions. Section 5 revisits Ljungqvist and
Sargent’s model and shows how changes in their key assumptions would alter their
results.
My own research adds another, so far little explored, dimension to this liter-
ature. I investigate to what degree differences in retraining opportunities are re-
sponsible for the divergence of unemployment rates between the U.S. and Europe.
In my model, unemployed workers search for jobs as well as suitable retraining
programs. I ﬁnd that when it becomes more difﬁcult to locate suitable retraining
programs, enrollment rates, productivity and the unemployment rate decline. As it
becomes harder to ﬁnd suitable training programs, the value of remaining unem-
ployed decreases, prompting unemployed workers to accept jobs at higher rates.
Productivity declines as fewer low-skilled workers enroll in training programs and
upgrade their skill to the higher skill level.
Furthermore, this paper is the ﬁrst attempt to investigate the role of retraining in
economies that are subject to economic turbulences as described by Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998, 2004). Using a similar parametrization as Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2004), I ﬁnd that the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts, the main driving force
in their model, is not an important determinant of unemployment, even during tu-
multuous economic times, if sufﬁciently good retraining institutions are available.
Economies with more ﬂexible retraining institutions adjust better to economic tur-
bulence, and as a result, feature lower unemployment rates and higher productivity
and output. An increase in economic turbulence leads to a decrease in unemploy-
ment rates a model calibrated to the European economy, while it leads to a very
slight increase in unemployment in the U.S. economy. Economies in which unem-
4ployed workers have the ability to retrain feature lower unemployment rates than
similar non-training economies. As economic turbulence increases, retraining be-
comes less attractive and the probability of ﬁnding a suitable training opportunity
decreases, leading to a decline in the value of being unemployed. As a result, the
job ﬁnding rate in the training economies increases with turbulence, leading to a
lower unemployment rate than in non-training economies.
These results suggest that differences in retraining institutions might play an
importantroleinexplainingcross-countrydifferencesinunemploymentrates. Coun-
tries with more widely available retraining opportunities should have adjusted bet-
ter to turbulence and feature lower unemployment rates. My results also suggest
that economic turbulence as modeled by Ljungqvist and Sargent cannot fully ex-
plain the divergence of unemployment rates between the U.S. and Europe.
2 Retraining
In this section, I present different proxies for retraining in OECD countries and re-
view the existing literature. Unfortunately, there is no internationally comparable
data on retraining. I deﬁne a worker who receives retraining as someone above
the age of 30 years who is enrolled in an educational program. My assumption
is that somebody who is at least 30 years old is not obtaining her ﬁrst qualiﬁca-
tion, but is enrolled in educational courses for retraining purposes. The data I use
was extracted from the OECD Online Education Database and does not include
“courses or classes for adults that are primarily for general interest or personal en-
richment and or for leisure or recreation” (OECD, 2004; p.15). I only use data for
the years 1998 to 2002 because earlier data is not comparable. For the remainder
of the section, all data I present are for workers 30 years and older. In all my data,
the United Kingdom is an extreme outlier. Therefore I also report data for OECD
Europe excluding the U.K., which I will simply refer to as OECD Europe in what
follows.
2.1 Some Facts
There is tremendous heterogeneity across OECD countries with respect to retrain-
ing. Table 1 shows total enrollment in retraining programs as a fraction of the
labor force for 18 European countries, as well as Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
and the United States. This fraction ranges from 0.1 percent for Japan to 12.8 per-
cent for the U.K. Using this proxy, enrollment rates in the U.S. are more than twice
as high as in OECD Europe. Within Europe, Nordic countries have the highest
enrollment rates, while southern European countries have among the lowest. Japan
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Austria 1.9 31.3 6.1 90.8
Belgium 3.8 4.9 1.3 7.4
Denmark 3.1 44.2 30.5 100.0
Finland 5.5 42.4 25.4 100.0
France 0.6 6.9 1.4 100.0
Germany 1.5 14.9 2.0 97.2
Greece 0.0 0.2 0.1 100.0
Iceland 4.4 55.9 36.4 48.3
Ireland 0.2 2.9 2.9 72.2
Italy 1.1 14.6 0.9 98.8
Luxembourg 0.2 1.3 1.3 13.8
Netherlands 2.0 20.7 15.4 34.9
Norway 3.8 53.4 26.6 63.7
Portugal 1.6 5.9 2.2 88.4
Spain 1.6 6.6 0.3 47.5
Sweden 7.5 32.0 20.4 31.8
Switzerland 1.4 24.1 8.8 54.5
United Kingdom 12.8 28.5 22.4 13.0
OECD Europe 3.5 15.6 5.7 35.8
OECD Europe (no UK) 1.7 13.9 3.3 68.9
Australia 6.8 17.8 7.5 11.4
New Zealand 5.3 28.9 15.0 34.3
Japan 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
United States 3.9 27.9 14.9 33.7
Source: OECD Education database; OECD Annual Labour Force Statistics, Part III; own calculations. 
Table 1: Different Proxies for Retraining (Averages for 1998-2002)
has virtually no workers above the age of 30 enrolled in formal training programs,
which suggests that training might be organized within ﬁrms. Enrollment rates in
Australia and New Zealand, on the other hand, are extremely high, ranging from
5.3 percent in New Zealand to 6.8 percent in Australia. An alternative proxy for
retraining presented in Table 1 is full-time enrollment of workers as a fraction of
unemployment. According to this proxy, the U.S. has enrollment rates that are
approximately twice as high as those in Europe. Again, Nordic countries have
the highest enrollment rates, while southern European countries have among the
lowest. One drawback of this proxy is that in some countries full-time enrollment
consists to a large degree of enrollment in Tertiary A courses, the equivalent of
college in the U.S. (see Appendix for deﬁnitions and details). A high fraction of
6enrollment in Tertiary A courses might indicate that many of these students are still
in the process of ﬁnishing their ﬁrst university degree.
To correct for this potential shortcoming, I also present a third proxy of retrain-
ing. Table 1 also shows full-time enrollment, excluding Tertiary A enrollment, as a
fraction of unemployment. According to this proxy, enrollment for some European
countries such as Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain is reduced by up to 96
percent. Without Tertiary A participants, the enrollment rate in the U.S. is about
ﬁve times higher than in Europe.
The United States and Europe not only differ in enrollment rates, but also in the
intensityofretrainingprograms. AsTable1shows, U.S.workersenrollinpart-time
programs at a much higher rate than European workers do. Some countries, such
as France, Germany, and Italy, seem to only have full-time programs for adults.
Table 2 points out potentially important differences in the types of retraining
programs between the two continents. While in Europe and the U.S. the fraction
of total enrolled workers who participate in Tertiary A programs is approximately
equal, the United States enrolls a signiﬁcantly higher fraction in Tertiary B and
post-secondary non-tertiary programs. Europe, on the other hand, has much higher
enrollmentinuppersecondaryprograms. IntheU.S.15.9percentofenrolledwork-
ers above the age of 30 participate in post-secondary programs, as compared to
only 2 percent in Europe. There are also tremendous differences within Europe.
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the
U.K. enroll more than 30 percent of students in upper secondary programs, while
France, Germany, and Italy only enroll between 0.1 and 7.4 percent in these pro-
grams. The data suggest that France, Germany, and Italy do not have very good
infrastructures for continuing training. Almost 70 percent of all European students
above the age of 30 years enroll in tertiary A courses, of which the majority are
probably still working on their ﬁrst degree.
To get an idea of whether countries that have high retraining rates are also those
with low unemployment rates, I calculated correlations between the aggregate un-
employment rates and the proxies for retraining discussed above. The results are
presented in Table 3. For each proxy, aggregate unemployment rates are negatively
correlated with retraining; that is, more retraining is associated with lower unem-
ployment rates. The correlations between unemployment rates and some of these
proxies are quite high, ranging from -0.06 to -0.60. Although these correlations do
not imply causality, they do suggest that retraining may have a positive effect on
the aggregate unemployment rate. The presented evidence suggests that retraining
institutions in the U.S. are more ﬂexible than in Europe. The data show that there
are large differences in enrollment rates, which might also imply that the variety
of retraining programs, and the associated career paths, is much larger in the U.S.
The higher enrollment rate in part-time programs suggests that U.S. workers have
7Tertiary A Tertiary B
Austria 78.6 4.7 11.7 5.0
Belgium 7.3 12.2 80.0 0.5
Denmark 43.5 22.4 32.7 1.4
Finland 53.6 5.4 36.3 4.8
France 81.4 10.0 3.8 4.8
Germany 85.6 13.1 0.1 1.1
Greece 10.7 80.9 2.4 5.9
Iceland 46.3 7.1 43.2 3.3
Ireland 0.0 0.0 38.9 61.1
Italy 85.3 0.7 7.4 6.6
Luxembourg 0.0 9.6 9.3 81.1
Netherlands 55.2 1.7 37.6 5.5
Norway 73.8 4.0 19.7 2.5
Portugal 76.3 7.9 15.8 0.0
Spain 82.4 0.4 17.0 0.1
Sweden 36.7 1.6 60.2 1.5
Switzerland 50.0 28.9 11.0 10.1
United Kingdom 11.2 12.6 76.1 0.0
OECD Europe 34.0 10.5 54.6 0.8
OECD Europe (no UK) 67.2 7.4 23.4 2.0
Australia 22.2 10.8 53.8 13.2
New Zealand 28.9 17.0 36.4 17.7
Japan 77.0 6.0 17.1 0.0
United States 65.0 16.0 3.1 15.9
Source: OECD Education database; OECD Annual Labour Force Statistics, Part III; 






Table 2: Level of Education (Averages for 1998-2002)
8Unemployment Rate
Full- & Part-Time (as % of LFS) -0.16
Full-Time (as % of unempl.) -0.44
Full- & Part-Time (as % of LFS) -0.28
Full-Time (as % of unempl.) -0.60
Full- & Part-Time (as % of LFS) -0.21
Full-Time (as % of unempl.) -0.41
Full- & Part-Time (as % of LFS) -0.23
Full-Time (as % of unempl.) -0.40
Full- & Part-Time (as % of LFS) -0.06
Full-Time (as % of unempl.) -0.41
Full- & Part-Time (as % of LFS) -0.13













Table 3: Correlations between Enrollment and Unemployment for 1998-2002
more ﬂexibility of when to attend training classes. Furthermore, there are also
large differences in retraining across European countries, suggesting that differ-
ences in retraining opportunities might help explain cross-country differences in
unemployment rates.
2.2 Literature
Much of the literature on retraining the unemployed has concentrated on evaluating
active labor market programs (ALMP) in which unemployed workers participate
in government-provided training programs, often as a condition for the renewal of
entitlements to unemployment beneﬁts (e.g. see Calmfors, 1995, p. 590). For
survey articles see Calmfors et al. (2002) and Martin (1998). The results of these
studies vary greatly. While some programs seem to be very successful, others seem
to make matters worse. In my model, I assume that retraining is not provided by the
government but instead through private institutions. Therefore, I will not further
discuss this line of research.
Coles and Masters (2000) analyze the effects of skill depreciation on the equi-
librium level and composition of unemployment and retraining. They develop a
continuous-time, Pissarides style matching model with a continuum of workers
and free entry of ﬁrms. Each period, a fraction of workers retires and an equal
fraction newly enters the unemployment pool. All new workers are identical and
are initially endowed with the highest possible skill level. If workers remain un-
employed, their skills lose relevance over time, which is modeled as a depreciation
at a ﬁxed rate. Workers do not lose skills while being employed. Furthermore,
9each employer has access to a retraining technology and can retrain a worker at
some cost. When an active job seeker and a ﬁrm with a vacancy meet, they both
observe the job seeker’s current skill level. Either the ﬁrm or the worker may re-
ject the potential match and continue search. If they desire to form a match, the
worker and ﬁrm negotiate over the wage, the amount of training and the worker’s
contribution to training costs. Upon reaching an agreement, both parties leave the
market for good. In equilibrium, workers whose skills are below a certain cut-off
will never be hired and are unemployable. They stop looking for work. All other
workers reach immediate agreement with employers and get trained to the highest
level of skill. Coles and Masters suggest that governments should offer positive
unemployment beneﬁts to ensure that very low-skilled workers do not search for
jobs and thus do not generate negative congestion externalities on the matching
rates of higher skilled workers. The positive depreciation of skills implies that
governments should subsidize vacancy creation. However, because of the lack of
externalities associated with retraining, governments should not subsidize training.
These conclusions heavily depend on how the authors model retraining. If
workers could retrain prior to meeting a ﬁrm in the matching market, as they can in
my model, all three conclusions would probably be overturned. In that case, very
low-skilled workers would receive retraining until they were employable. Further-
more, governments should probably subsidize retraining to some extent, since it
would increase the rate at which workers ﬁnd new jobs. The case for subsidizing
vacancy creation over retraining might be further weakened if low and high-skilled
workers were in different labor markets and would not compete for the same jobs.
My model differs from Coles and Masters in two ways. Firstly, I consider retrain-
ing of the unemployed explicitly in an economy which is subjected to the kind
of economic turbulence proposed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). Secondly, in
my model unemployed workers have a choice of whether to retrain prior to meet-
ing a ﬁrm. Workers who upgrade their skills do not only increase their earnings
potential, but also increase their chance of ﬁnding employment.
Masters (2000) develops a model based on Pissarides (1985) that incorporates
labor market training. In his model, workers enter the market trained to do two
different jobs. After receiving offers they accept jobs that require only one of their
skills. Masters assumes that workers instantaneously forget the skill they do not
utilize in their current job. As a consequence, a worker who becomes unemployed
is only available for employment in the area of his previous employment. Workers
can retrain at some cost, which allows them to re-enter the labor market with the
same options as a new entrant. Masters shows that if vacancy creation is perfectly
elastic, employment necessarily increases with training. If efﬁciency is desired, the
government should not subsidize retraining. If the number of jobs in the economy
is ﬁxed, multiple equilibria may exist, providing a role for government interven-
10tion.
Krueger and Kumar (2004) analyze the effect of education policy on economic
growth. Their claim is that Europe’s focus on speciﬁc skill acquisition worked
well during the 1960s and 1970s when technological progress was relatively slow.
However, starting in the 1980s, technological change accelerated and countries that
put a greater emphasis on general skill acquisition, such as the U.S., experienced
higher growth rates. The key assumption in their model is that only workers with
general education are able to operate new production technologies, whereas vo-
cationally trained workers are more efﬁcient in operating established technologies
but are unable to operate new ones. In their model, newly born workers make
an irreversible choice about what kind of education to receive. Acquiring general
education is more costly than acquiring speciﬁc skills, but operating newer, more
productive technologies is also associated with higher wages. Firms may choose
to operate using a well-understood, commonly available technology for which they
can hire workers with speciﬁc skills. Alternatively, ﬁrms may decide to adopt cut-
ting edge technologies at some cost but have to employ workers with general skills.
Krueger and Kumar show that as the rate of newly available technologies increases,
countries that emphasize vocational training could experience slower growth rates.
Although their paper is not directly related to my work, one could reinterpret the
idea that vocationally educated workers cannot operate new machinery as the ab-
sence of retraining opportunities. In this case, rapid technological progress, which
in my model is equivalent to an increase in economic turbulence, could lead to a




ing model and extend it to allow for worker heterogeneity and retraining of the un-
employed. The basic set-up is similar to Den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey (2004) and
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). In this environment, time is discrete and the econ-
omy is populated by a constant measure one of risk-neutral workers who can obtain
two different skill levels k, where k = h denotes high skills and k = l low skills.
Each period a measure of ½ workers retires and a measure of ½ workers enters the
work force with low skills. Workers have two options to upgrade their skills: (1)
they can become employed and face a probability°U of an upgrade to the high skill
level or (2) they can enroll in training programs at per period cost ¿ while being
unemployed and face a probability °T of upgrading their skill. Employment rela-
tionships break up exogenously with probability s. Upon separation, high-skilled
11workers lose their skills with probability °D. In every period, unemployed workers
are eligible for unemployment beneﬁts bj, where the level of beneﬁts depends on
the workers’ last earnings so that j denotes the skill level before entering the unem-
ployment pool. Workers must spend a minimum of one period in a high skilled-job
in order to be eligible for high unemployment beneﬁts. There are four groups of
workers, each one characterized by its skill level and beneﬁt entitlement, (k;j):
(1) low-skilled workers entitled to low unemployment beneﬁts ((l;l) workers), (2)
formerly high-skilled workers who experienced a skill downgrade upon lay-off and
are entitled to high beneﬁts ((l;h) workers), (3) formerly low-skilled workers who
just upgraded to the high skill level and are entitled to low beneﬁts ((h;l) workers),
and (4) high-skilled workers entitled to high beneﬁts ((h;h) workers).
Production requires an employment relationship between one worker and one
ﬁrm who produce output z per period. After meeting in the matching market, new
worker-ﬁrm pairs choose to accept or reject their matches after observing their ini-
tial productivity draw z from a c.d.f. Gk(z), where Gh(z) ﬁrst order stochastically
dominates Gl(z). Bargaining is efﬁcient, so that workers and ﬁrms aim to max-
imize their joint surplus. The division of match surplus is determined by Nash
bargain, where the workers’ bargaining weight is Á.
3.1 Matching Market





where M(uk;j;vk;j) is the measure of successful matches per period, uk;j denotes
the measure of unemployed workers with skill level k and beneﬁt entitlements bj,
and vk;j is the measure of ﬁrms posting vacancies for skill k workers with beneﬁts
bj. There are four matching markets, one for each worker group, that use the same
technology, with A > 0 and ® 2 (0;1). A ﬁrm’s probability of matching with a






where xk;j = vk;j=uk;j is the vacancy-unemployment ratio. The probability that






12After a match is formed, the initial productivity draw z is observed. Any draw
above the cut-off level z¤
k;j, i.e z ¸ z¤
k;j, is acceptable, and an employment rela-
tionship is formed. For draws below the cut-off it is in the mutual interest of both










dGk(z) = 1 ¡ Gk(z¤
k;j)
A ﬁrm successfully hires a skill k worker if it matched with a worker and the















The job ﬁnding rate could potentially be greater than one, which would be a prob-
lem in this model. However, in my numerical simulations, the job ﬁnding rate is
always within the interval [0;1].
3.2 Joint Surplus
Let Ek;j(z) denote the value a fk;jg worker receives from being employed, Uk;j
the worker’s value of being unemployed, and Jk;j(z) a ﬁrm’s value of a ﬁlled
job. The joint surplus from an employment relationship is the sum of the worker’s
surplus, Ek;j(z) ¡ Uk;j, and the ﬁrm’s surplus, Jk;j(z). For a fk;jg worker, the
joint surplus is thus
Sk;j(z) = Ek;j(z) ¡ Uk;j + Jk;j(z) (1)
I assume that ﬁrms can freely enter this economy so that the value of a vacancy
is zero in equilibrium. The cut-off z¤
k;j is the level of productivity at which the
joint surplus of an employment relationship is zero. Since bargaining results in
an efﬁcient allocation, workers and ﬁrms aim to maximize the joint surplus and
would reject any productivity that would result in negative surplus. The reservation
productivity z¤




Aﬁrm’svalueofa ﬁlled jobJk;j isgivenbythe produced outputz andthe expected
present value of continuing the employment relationship less the wage wk;j(z) it
has to pay the worker. For a fl;jg ﬁrm, a ﬁrm that hires low skilled workers who
are entitled to either low (j = l) or high (j = h) unemployment beneﬁts, this value
is given by
Jl;j(z) = zl;j ¡ wl;j(z) + ¯ (1 ¡ s)[(1 ¡ °U)Jl;j(z) + °U ¹ Jh;l] (2)





h;l)gh(z)dz is the conditional expectation of Jh;l(z)
given that z ¸ z¤
h;l. For the remainder of the paper I will denote ¹ Jk;j and ¹ Ek;j as the
conditional expectations of Jk;j(z) and Ek;j(z), respectively, given that z ¸ z¤
h;l.
The time discount factor ¯ = (1¡½)=(1+r) includes the probability of surviving
tothenextperiod, (1¡½). A ﬁlledjobturns intoavacancywith probabilitys. Ifthe
employment relationship continues, the worker either receives a skill upgrade with
probability °U or remains at the current low skill level with probability 1¡°U. Af-
ter a skill upgrade a worker receives a new productivity draw from the distribution
Gh(z). An assumption I maintain throughout this paper is that upgraded workers
always receive productivity draws above the new cut-off level. This assumption
ensures that upgraded workers are not at risk of becoming unemployed. Even after
a skill upgrade the worker-ﬁrm relationship is maintained. The ﬁrm thus expects
to receive ¹ Jh;l with probability °U instead of its current value Jl;j(z). Similarly,
the value of a ﬁlled job for a fh;jg ﬁrm is given by
Jh;j(z) = zh;j ¡ wh;j(z) + ¯ (1 ¡ s)Jh;j(z) (3)
Before a ﬁrm can hire any worker, it is required to post a vacancy at cost ck;j.
The assumption that ﬁrms can enter freely implies that ﬁrms expect to earn zero
proﬁts from posting a vacancy in equilibrium. The associate equilibrium condition
is given by
¯h(xk;j) ¹ Jk;j = ck;j (4)
This equilibrium condition states that the expected beneﬁt of a vacancy, given by
¯h(xk;j) ¹ Jk;j, equals the cost of posting it, ck;j.
3.4 Workers
A fk;jg worker can either be employed and receive a value of Ek;j(z) or be unem-
ployed and receive Uk;j. In addition, low-skilled unemployed workers may enroll
14in retraining programs, receiving a value of Rj. A fl;jg worker’s value of being
employed is given by
El;j(z) = wl;j(z) + ¯[sUl;l + (1 ¡ s)(°u ¹ Eh;l + (1 ¡ °u)El;j(z))] (5)
Both types of low-skilled workers have similar continuation values because fl;hg
workers lose their entitlements to high unemployment beneﬁts after working one
period as low skilled workers. For fh;jg workers, the value of being employed is
Eh;j(z) = wh;j(z) + ¯[s(°dUl;h + (1 ¡ °d)Uh;h) + (1 ¡ s)Eh;j(z)] (6)
Again, the continuation value for both types of high skilled workers are similar
because fh;lg workers become eligible for high beneﬁts after one period of em-
ployment.
Unemployed workers receive unemployment beneﬁts bj and search for new
jobs. Beneﬁts depend on the workers’ last earnings. As a simpliﬁcation I take bj =
± ¹ wj;j, where ± 2 (0;1) is the replacement ratio and ¹ wj;j denotes the average wage
of a (j;j) = f(l;l);(h;h)g worker. Low-skilled unemployed workers also search
for suitable training programs that allow them to upgrade their skills. Unemployed
workers always take acceptable job offers. Only when they have not receive any
acceptable job offers will they consider enrolling in training programs. The value
of a fl;jg worker of being unemployed is given by
Ul;j = bj + ¯[f (xl;j) ¹ El;j + (1 ¡ f (xl;j))f(1 ¡ F(o¤
j)) ¹ Rj + F(o¤
j)Ul;jg] (7)
where oj 2 [0;1] represents the quality of the training opportunity. With probabil-
ity 1¡F(o¤
j) this opportunity is better than the threshold o¤
j and the worker enrolls
in the training program and expects to receive ¹ Rj, where ¹ Rj is the conditional
expectation of Rj(oj) given that oj ¸ o¤
j.
The value of a fh;jg worker of being unemployed is given by
Uh;j = bj + ¯[f (xh;j) ¹ Eh;j + (1 ¡ f (xh;j))Uh;j] (8)
3.5 Training
As mentioned above, low-skilled unemployed workers may choose to enroll in
training programs at a per period cost ¿ to upgrade from low to high skill levels.
Every period, unemployed workers learn about training opportunities. The quality
of this opportunity, denoted by oj, may depend on several factors. For example,
workers might have very speciﬁc preferences over future career paths. Training op-
portunities that provide skills for less preferable careers might then be regarded as
low quality opportunities. Other factors may include the reputation of the training
15institution, admissions standards, and the distance to the training facility. Every
period oj is drawn from a c.d.f. F(o).
Once an acceptable opportunity is found and a worker enrolls in the training
program, there is a probability°T thather effortswill besuccessful. Withprobabil-
ity 1 ¡ °T retraining will be unsuccessful and the worker will remain low-skilled.
A worker’s value of retraining, Rj(oj), is given by
Rj(oj) = bj + °T [Uh;j ¡ bj] + (1 ¡ °T)¯[f (xl;j) ¹ El;j






I assume that enrolled workers continue to receive unemployment beneﬁts. When
a worker successfully upgrades her skill, she receives the continuation value of a
high skilled unemployed worker, Uh;j ¡ bj, in the next period. If the retraining is
unsuccessful, the worker receives the continuation value of a low-skilled worker in
the next period, with one difference. I interpret a draw of oj ¸ o¤
j by an enrolled
worker as remaining in the current training program. In this case, the worker will
receive exactly the same value, e.g. Rj(oj) and not ¹ Rj. Hence, workers search for
employment while being enrolled and decide whether to drop out or not, i.e. they
do not necessarily have to spend time being unemployed in order to ﬁnd a job. The
total cost of retraining is ¿=oj, where ¿ can be interpreted as a tuition cost. Total
cost is inversely related to the quality of the training opportunity. If oj = 1, the
education program is a perfect ﬁt for the worker and the only remaining cost is ¿.
If oj < 1, the opportunity is a less than perfect ﬁt and implies a worker’s lower
willingness to take up retraining. In the model, this lower willingness is equivalent
to a higher cost of retraining.
The expected surplus from enrolling in a retraining program is given by
ST(oj) = Rj(oj) ¡ Ul;j (10)
Workers enroll in retraining courses if they expect to receive a higher value from
enrolling than from remaining unemployed, i.e. if ST(oj) ¸ 0. The cut-off level
o¤




In this section I present the steady-state equations for the different groups of un-
employed, employed, and enrolled workers. There are four unemployment groups,
four employment groups, and two enrollment groups, which are denoted by ul;l,
16ul;h, uh;l, uh;h, el;l, el;h, eh;l, eh;h, rl;l, and rl;h. Just like above, the ﬁrst subscript
indicates the skill level and the second the level of unemployment beneﬁts. For the
computation of average productivity levels I would principally also have to keep
track of workers who started employment in el;h or eh;l and transitioned into the
el;l or eh;h groups. These workers have different productivities than workers en-
tering the el;l or eh;h groups directly. The differences in productivity arise from
differences in acceptance rates, i.e. these workers require higher (or lower) pro-
ductivity draws in order to accept job offers. However, for the sake of simplicity I
abstract from these differences as the ﬂow of these workers is very small so that the
results would not be affected. The main points of the following exercises would be
unchanged. Each of the following steady-state equations has the same format, with
inﬂows on the left and outﬂows on the right.
The ul;l state:
½ + (1 ¡ ½)fs(el;l + el;h) + (1 ¡ °T)(1 ¡ f (xl;l))F(o¤
l )rlg
= f½ + (1 ¡ ½)(f (xl;l) + (1 ¡ f (xl;l))(1 ¡ F(o¤
l ))gul;l (11)
The ﬂow into the ul;l state consists of two groups. The ﬁrst one includes low-
skilled employed workers who lost their jobs, while the second group consists of
workers in retraining who did not upgrade to the high skill level, did not ﬁnd jobs as
low-skilled workers and were unable to ﬁnd other suitable training opportunities.
I make the assumption that enrolled workers search for jobs and new retraining
opportunities in every period. If they do not upgrade to the higher skill level, but
instead ﬁnd an acceptable job, they take it over any retraining opportunity1. This
assumption is also reﬂected on the right side of the equation. Only workers who
do not ﬁnd suitable jobs consider enrolling in retraining. The ﬂow out of the ul;l
state consists of three groups: retirees, unemployed workers who ﬁnd jobs, and
unemployed workers who enroll in retraining programs. The transition equation
for the ul;h state is very similar.
The ul;h state:
(1 ¡ ½)fs°D(eh;h + eh;l) + (1 ¡ °T)(1 ¡ f (xl;h))F(o¤
h)rhg
= f½ + (1 ¡ ½)(f (xl;h) + (1 ¡ f (xl;h))(1 ¡ F(o¤
h)))gul;h (12)
The uh;l state:
(1 ¡ ½)°T(1 ¡ f (xh;l))rl = f½ + (1 ¡ ½)f (xh;l)guh;l (13)
1In steady-state, the average value of being employed as a low-skilled worker is higher than the




s(1 ¡ °D)(eh;h + eh;l) + (1 ¡ f (xh;h))°Trh
ª




f (xl;l)ul;l + (1 ¡ °T)f (xl;l)rl + (1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ °U)el;h
ª




f (xl;h)ul;h + (1 ¡ °T)f (xl;h)rh
ª
= el;h (16)
Note that workers can spend at most one period in the el;h or eh;l state. After one















(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ f (xl;l))(1 ¡ F(o¤
l ))ul;l = f½ + (1 ¡ ½)(°T
+ (1 ¡ °T)(f (xl;l) + (1 ¡ f (xl;l))F(o¤
l )))grl (19)
The rh state:
(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ f (xl;h))(1 ¡ F(a¤
h))ul;h = f½ + (1 ¡ ½)(°T
+ (1 ¡ °T)(f (xl;h) + (1 ¡ f (xl;h))F(o¤
h)))grh (20)
4 Calibration
In this section I calibrate my model in two different ways. One resembles the U.S.
economy while the other mimics a typical European economy. Both economies
share a set of common parameters, which I take to a large degree from Ljungqvist
18andSargent(2004)inordertocomparemyresultsbetterwiththeirs. Botheconomies
differ, however, in three important ways: (1) separation rates, (2) unemployment
beneﬁt replacement ratios, and (3) retraining enrollment rates. In my model these
differences are captured by the parameters s, ±, and ¿, respectively, and imply, to-
gether with restrictions on ¸w, differences in the matching efﬁciency parameter A
and the vacancy creation costs c. Before I discuss the country-speciﬁc parameters
I present parameters common to both economies.
4.1 Common Parameters
I set the model period to be one month and assume an annual interest rate of 5.0
percent, or r = 0:004074. Workers’ life spans are geometrically distributed with
an expected duration of 50 years, implying ½ = 0:001667. These two parameters
determine the monthly discount factor ¯ = 0:9942. Following Ljungqvist and Sar-
gent (2004), I set the workers’ bargaining power to Á = 0:50 and choose a monthly
probability of skill upgrade of °U = 0:01, so that it takes on average 8 years and 4
months, conditional on no job loss, to move from the low skill level to the high skill
level. Both skill groups draw productivities from uniform distributions with iden-
tical standard deviations of 1=
p
12 but different means. The mean productivity for
low-skilled workers is 1, while that of high-skilled workers is twice as high. I set
the monthly probability of skill loss to °D = 0:10, which is the same as the 10 per-
cent per quarter used by Den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey (2004). Following Shimer
(2005), I set the elasticity of the matching function to ® = 0:72 which is also well
within the range of estimates for European economies. Burda and Wyplosz (1994)
report estimates for France, Germany, Spain, and the U.K. between 0.70 and 0.80
when imposing constant returns. The survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
shows that these estimates lie at the upper end of estimates for the elasticity of
matching with respect to unemployment. Finally, I set °T = 0:04 and the distri-
bution of training opportunities to be uniformly distributed over the unit interval.
Conditional on not leaving the training program, it takes on average 25 months to
upgrade to the higher skill level. This is four times faster than upgrading on the
job. A summary of these parameters can be found in Table 4.
4.2 Country Speciﬁc Parameters
In Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) the U.S. ”laissez-faire” economy and the Euro-
pean ”welfare state” differ only in the level of the unemployment beneﬁt replace-
ment ratio. They pick replacement ratios of 50 percent for the U.S. and 70 percent
for the European economy. While certain groups of unemployed workers face very
high replacement ratios in Europe, they are usually old workers who had relatively
19Parameter (monthly rates) Value
Interest rate, r 0.00407
Retirement probability, ȡ 0.00167
Worker's bargaining weight, ĳ 0.5
Probability of skill upgrade, Ȗ
U 0.01
Probability of skill downgrade, Ȗ
D 0.1
Probability of training success, Ȗ
T 0.04
Uniform productivity distribution
mean for low-skill workers, E(zl)  1.0




Elasticity of the matching function, Į 0.72
Table 4: Common Parameter Values
low earnings prior to getting laid-off. Martin (1996) presents data for gross re-
placement rates that are considerably lower than the replacement rates used by
Ljungqvist and Sargent. Martin also reports an estimate of the average unweighted
net replacement ratio of 50 percent for OECD countries in 1994/95. Despite the ev-
idence for lower replacement ratios, I use the same values Ljungqvist and Sargent
proposed for better comparability.
Theseparationrate is anotherimportant differencebetweenthe twoeconomies.
Table 5 suggests that the monthly U.S. separation rate lies between 2.3 and 3.2 per-
cent, while Shimer (2005) reports an average separation rate of 3.4 percent per
month using data from 1951 to 2003. Abowd and Zellner (1985) ﬁnd a separa-
tion rate of 3.42 percent for the period between 1972 and 1982. In light of this
evidence, I set the monthly separation rate for my U.S. calibration to be 3.4 per-
cent. This number is considerably higher than the 1.8 percent used by Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998). Table 5 also suggests that separation rates in Europe are con-
siderably lower than those in the U.S. Sweden had rates below 1 percent in the
1970s and 1980s, while Finland and Norway had rates around 1 percent. France
and Spain had separation rates between 1 percent and 1.6 percent. The unweighted
OECD average between 1970 and 2003 was 1.4 percent and that of the G7 coun-
tries was 1.8 percent. Zimmermann (1998) reports values for Germany ranging
from 0.58 percent in 1991 to 0.88 percent in 1981. In light of this evidence I set
the separation rate to s = 0:01 for the European economy.
Evidence presented earlier suggests that both economies also differ in the num-
ber of workers enrolled in retraining programs. I calibrate the parameter¿ such that
201970s 1980s 1990s 2000-2003 1970-2003
Australia 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.7
Canada 3.5 3.7 3.3 3.0 3.4
Czech Republic 0.7 0.7 0.7
Finland 1.1 1.3 1.8
France 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.3
G7 countries 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.8
Hungary 0.6 0.6
Mexico 2.5 1.7 2.2
North America 3.0 3.2 2.4 2.1 2.8
Norway 1.0 1.2 1.1
Oceania 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5
OECD countries 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.4
Poland 1.8 2.4 2.0
Slovak Republic 1.5 2.2 1.8
Spain 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.0 1.5
Sweden 0.2 0.2 0.2
United States 3.0 3.2 2.4 2.3 2.8
Source: OECD, own calculations. 
Table 5: Average Job Losing Rates in Percent of Employed
the total enrollment equals 3 percent of the labor force in the U.S. economy and 1
percent of the labor force in Europe.
There are ﬁve parameters left to calibrate: The efﬁciency of the matching func-
tion, A, and the four recruiting costs cj;k. For each economy, I restrict all four
worker matching probabilities ¸w to be the same at the calibration point. Unfortu-
nately, I am unable to use the same matching probabilities for all four economics.
The model including retraining is very tightly parameterized, so that I simply pick
values that work. The probably of matching is not very important to show the
qualitative effects retraining has on my economies. I take ¸w = 0:40 for the U.S.
and ¸w = 0:50 for the European training economy. These values are considerably
higher than the 30 percent used by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). Furthermore I
restrict the (unweighted) mean of the recruiting costs to 7 percent of the average
annual wages, a number used by Joseph et al. (2004) and similar to Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999). The resulting parameters of this calibration can be found in
Table 6.
In order to compare the training and non-training economies, I calibrate a ver-
sion of my model without retraining in the same way described above. However,














Separation rate, s 3.4% 3.4% 1.0% 1.0%
Benefit replacement rate, į 50% 50% 70% 70%
Tuition cost, Ĳ 0.65 1.46
Worker matching probability, Ȝ
w 0.40 0.37 0.50 0.26
Efficiency of matching, A 0.52 0.43 0.68 0.33
Recruiting costs
cl,l 1.10 1.60 1.71 2.09
cl,h 0.09 0.72 0.01 0.44
ch,l 3.07 2.15 3.67 2.91
ch,h 1.98 1.26 1.72 1.25
Table 6: Country Speciﬁc Parameter Values
rates requires different matching probabilities for the non-training economies. I set
the workers’ matching probabilities to 37 percent (U.S.) and 26 percent (Europe).
The resulting parameters of this calibration can also be found in Table 6.
5 Ljungqvist and Sargent Revisited
Before presenting the results of my model I discuss the robustness of Ljungqvist
and Sargent’s approach. Two assumptions drive the result of their paper: (1) very
high unemployment beneﬁts in their welfare economy, and (2) exogenous breaks
in employment relationships. In regards to the ﬁrst assumption, it is unrealistic to
assume a replacement rate of 70 percent in an economy where unemployment ben-
eﬁts run forever. The second assumption can be criticized along two lines. While
it is not unusual to model separations as determined by an exogenously given pa-
rameter, it could be a confounding assumption. With an increase in the probability
of skill loss upon separation, separating becomes more costly for workers. In this
case we would expect that workers would try harder to avoid separations by ac-
cepting wage cuts, working extended hours, and increasing their efforts. Den Haan
et al. (2004) show that allowing for endogenous separations reverses Ljungqvist
and Sargent’s result. As economic turbulence increases, high-skilled workers be-
come so afraid of skill loss upon quitting their jobs that they choose to stay with
the same ﬁrm for longer, actually causing a decrease in the unemployment rate. In
22Den Haan et al.’s model an increase in turbulence implies that employed workers
who receive a productivity switch are more likely to accept low productivity draws.
Their results hold even if high-skilled workers who voluntarily quit their jobs face
skill loss probabilities as low as 0.3 percent. With exogenous separations the ef-
fect of Ljungqvist and Sargent’s mechanism is larger the greater the difference in
mean productivities between the two skill groups. A greater difference in produc-
tivity implies a greater difference in average wages. However, a greater difference
in average wages implies a greater disincentive for low-skilled unemployed work-
ers with high beneﬁts to ﬁnd new jobs (see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004). With
endogenous separations, on the other hand, a greater difference in productivity im-
plies a greater disincentive for high-skilled workers to voluntarily quit their jobs.
However, even if one only allows for exogenous separations, Ljungqvist and
Sargent’s result is not very robust with respect to changes in the separation rate.
In their economy, 1.8 percent of employed workers lose their jobs every month,
which is almost half the 3.4 percent average for the U.S. between 1951 and 2001
and about twice as high as the 1 percent suggested by Table 5 for the 1970s and
1980s in Europe. The choice of the separation rate is not benign, however. The
interaction between the separation rate s and the skill loss probability °D is es-
sential in Ljungqvist and Sargent’s model. Each month, employed high-skilled
workers face a probability of s°D of becoming unemployed and losing their skills.
When turbulence increases from °D = 0:1 to °D = 0:5, as Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2004) suggest in their paper, the probability of skill loss faced by high-skilled
workers increases from 0.18 to 0.9 percent. With a separation rate of 1 percent
this probability increase from 0.1 percent to 0.5 percent. With a separation rate of
3.5 percent, the rate at which high-skilled workers are laid-off and lose their skills
increases from 0.35 percent to 1.75 percent. Thus, in economies with higher sep-
aration rates, a larger proportion of high-skilled workers suffers from skill loss as
economic turbulence increases.
Tables7showshowdifferentassumptionsaboutparametervalueschangeLjungqvist
and Sargent’s predictions. I calibrate a version of my model without retraining to
an unemployment rate of 5.0 percent and separation rates ranging from 0.5 per-
cent to 4 percent with beneﬁt replacement rates of 50, 60, and 70 percent. The
gray shaded ﬁelds in the table mark the different calibration points. Increasing
turbulence does not matter much in an economy with a replacement ratio of only
50 percent. With a separation rate of 1 percent, unemployment increases from 5
percent to 5.17 percent when increasing turbulence from 10 to 50 percent. With a
separation rate of 0.5 percent, unemployment slightly decreases with an increase
in turbulence. In the model with a 3.5 percent separation rate, the unemployment
rate increases to 5.7 percent. Even when increasing the beneﬁt replacement rate to
60 percent, an increase in turbulence has hardly any effect on the unemployment
230.50% 1.00% 1.50% 2.00% 2.50% 3.00% 3.50% 4.00%
0% 5.01% 4.94% 4.89% 4.83% 4.76% 4.71% 4.66% 4.61%
10% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00%
20% 4.98% 5.04% 5.10% 5.14% 5.18% 5.22% 5.26% 5.27%
30% 4.98% 5.09% 5.19% 5.27% 5.35% 5.39% 5.44% 5.47%
40% 4.97% 5.13% 5.27% 5.38% 5.47% 5.53% 5.59% 5.62%
50% 4.96% 5.17% 5.34% 5.47% 5.57% 5.65% 5.70% 5.75%
60% 4.95% 5.20% 5.40% 5.54% 5.66% 5.74% 5.81% 5.85%
70% 4.94% 5.23% 5.45% 5.62% 5.73% 5.82% 5.88% 5.92%
80% 4.93% 5.26% 5.50% 5.68% 5.79% 5.89% 5.95% 5.99%
90% 4.92% 5.28% 5.55% 5.73% 5.85% 5.94% 6.00% 6.04%
100% 4.91% 5.31% 5.58% 5.77% 5.90% 5.99% 6.04% 6.09%
0.50% 1.00% 1.50% 2.00% 2.50% 3.00% 3.50% 4.00%
0% 4.98% 4.91% 4.83% 4.75% 4.69% 4.63% 4.57% 4.51%
10% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00%
20% 5.02% 5.10% 5.16% 5.22% 5.27% 5.31% 5.35% 5.38%
30% 5.04% 5.19% 5.31% 5.41% 5.51% 5.58% 5.66% 5.71%
40% 5.06% 5.27% 5.46% 5.60% 5.72% 5.84% 5.92% 6.00%
50% 5.08% 5.37% 5.59% 5.79% 5.93% 6.06% 6.17% 6.27%
60% 5.11% 5.45% 5.72% 5.94% 6.13% 6.28% 6.42% 6.53%
70% 5.13% 5.53% 5.86% 6.11% 6.32% 6.50% 6.66% 6.79%
80% 5.16% 5.62% 5.98% 6.27% 6.51% 6.72% 6.90% 7.09%
90% 5.18% 5.70% 6.11% 6.43% 6.70% 6.94% 7.18% 7.39%
100% 5.21% 5.78% 6.23% 6.59% 6.90% 7.18% 7.47% 7.75%
0.50% 1.00% 1.50% 2.00% 2.50% 3.00% 3.50% 4.00%
0% 4.91% 4.81% 4.71% 4.62% 4.52% 4.44% 4.36% 4.28%
10% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00%
20% 5.09% 5.21% 5.32% 5.42% 5.52% 5.64% 5.74% 5.86%
30% 5.20% 5.45% 5.68% 5.92% 6.18% 6.50% 6.94% 7.66%
40% 5.31% 5.70% 6.11% 6.57% 7.20% 8.30% 12.10% 63.51%
50% 5.42% 6.00% 6.64% 7.53% 9.36% 26.24% 63.33% 63.53%
60% 5.57% 6.35% 7.35% 9.27% 23.28% 70.23% 63.34%
70% 5.72% 6.75% 8.38% 13.90% 71.48%
80% 5.88% 7.25% 10.01% 71.78%
90% 6.06% 7.87% 13.14% 77.55%
100% 6.26% 8.67% 21.65%










































































































Pannel C: Unemployment Rates with į = 70%
seperation rate, s
Table 7: Unemployment Rates with Different Parameter Assumptions
24rate.
The effects become considerably larger when using a 70 percent replacement
ratio. Witha2percentseparationrate, anincreaseintheturbulencefrom10percent
to 50 percent increases the unemployment rate to 7.53 percent. This is an increase
comparable to that in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). However, when taking a
separation rate of 1 percent the unemployment rate increases to only 6.00 percent.
This compares to an increases to 5.70 percent for a separation rate of 3.5 percent
and a replacement ratio of 50 percent.
This exercise shows that an increase in turbulence as modeled by Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998, 2004) might have a more adverse effect on the U.S. economy
than on the European economy because job churning is much higher in the U.S. In
fact, the tables suggest that under reasonable assumptions for the European econ-
omy, such as a replacement ratio of 50 or 60 percent and separation rates between
0.5 and 1.5 percent, the effect of an increase in economic turbulence on unemploy-
ment rates is negligible. Even for replacement rates of 70 percent, the effect of
turbulence is very small for separation rates below 2 percent and skill loss proba-
bilities below 50 percent.
6 Retraining the Unemployed
To shed light on the effects of retraining I contrast the steady states of the U.S. and
European economies with and without training in Table 8. It should not come as a
surprise that the measure of high-skilled workers in the training economies is be-
tween 1.4 percent (Europe) and 11.0 percent (U.S.) larger than in the non-training
economies. At the same time, the measure of low-skilled workers in the training
economies is between 8.8 percent (Europe) and 27.7 percent (U.S.) smaller than in
the non-training economies. It follows that the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled
workers is between 11.1 percent (Europe) and 53.5 percent higher in the training
economies. Also note that the European non-training economy features a higher
skill-ratio than the U.S. training economy, a result of differences in the separa-
tion rate and replacement ratio. While the average job tenure in the U.S. economy
is only about 2 years and 5 months, it is 8 years and 4 months in the European
economy. Since it takes workers on average 8 years and 4 months to upgrade their
skills to the higher level, conditional on not being laid-off, there are relatively more
high-skilled workers in Europe. In addition, due to the higher unemployment ben-
eﬁt replacement ratio, European workers are more selective about which jobs to
accept, which translates into higher productivity.
In my model, high-skilled workers’ productivity draws are on average twice as













Fraction of low-skilled workers 26.2% 36.3% 21.3% 23.4%
Employed 21.6% 30.6% 16.4% 20.0%
Unemployed 4.7% 5.7% 4.9% 3.4%
Fraction of high-skilled workers  70.8% 63.7% 77.7% 76.7%
Employed 61.9% 55.5% 72.7% 70.0%
Unemployed 8.9% 8.2% 5.1% 6.7%
Ratio of high to low skilled workers 2.70 1.76 3.65 3.28
Employed only 2.87 1.82 4.43 3.50
Unemployed only 1.91 1.44 1.03 2.00
Average Productivity of employed 1.98 1.84 2.18 2.07
Low-skill workers 1.27 1.15 1.33 1.21
High-skill workers 2.22 2.22 2.37 2.32
GDP 1.65 1.59 1.94 1.87
Unemployment Rate 13.9% 13.9% 10.0% 10.0%
Low-skill workers 17.7% 15.8% 23.0% 14.3%
High-skill workers 12.5% 12.9% 6.5% 8.7%
Average duration of unemployment (weeks) 5.2 4.5 10.2 9.6
Acceptence rate of job offers
low skills, low benefits 46% 70% 34% 59%
low skills, high benefits 13% 47% 2% 27%
high skills, low benefits 69% 72% 39% 54%
high skills, high benefits 55% 55% 27% 35%
Job finding rate
low skills, low benefits 18% 26% 17% 15%
low skills, high benefits 5% 17% 1% 7%
high skills, low benefits 28% 27% 20% 14%
high skills, high benefits 22% 21% 13% 9%
Enrollment in training programs
Total as % of the labor force 3.0% 1.0%
Public Finance
Gross wage income 1.55 1.47 1.88 1.79
Cost of unemployment insurance 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.14
Cost of retraining 0.03 0.02
Net wage income 1.39 1.35 1.72 1.65
Table 8: Steady-State Values at Calibration Point
26sition, average productivity is between 4.8 percent (Europe) and 7.4 percent (U.S.)
higher in the training economies. Since productivity and wages are directly linked,
average wages are also higher in the training economies. The higher average pro-
ductivity results in higher GDP, despite the fact that overall employment is lower
in the training economies.
All workers have lower job acceptance rates in the training economies. The
availability of training programs for low-skilled unemployed workers increases the
value of being unemployed just like an increase in unemployment beneﬁts. An
increase in the value of being unemployed induces workers to be more selective
about which job offers to accept, leading to a decline in the acceptance rate and
job ﬁnding rate, but an increase in productivity. A decrease in the acceptance
rate implies a decrease in the job ﬁnding rate, given that the matching probability
remains unchanged. In my calibration exercise I had to choose different matching
probabilities for the different economies. While the acceptance rate of job offers is
lower in the training economies, some of the job ﬁnding rates are actually higher
due to differences in the matching probabilities. Given the change in incentives
for low-skilled workers to accept jobs, it is not surprising that their unemployment
ratesarehigherinthetrainingeconomieswithanincreasefrom14.3to23.0percent
in Europe and an increase from 15.8 to 17.7 percent in the U.S.
The unemployment rates for high-skilled workers decreases from 8.7 percent
in the European non-training economy to 6.5 percent in the training economy. In
the U.S. the high-skilled unemployment rate hardly changes, decreasing from 12.9
to 12.5 percent. These decreases are the result of the higher matching rate in the
training economy.
A crude measure of welfare in my economy is total net wage income. I cal-
culate this measure as gross wage income, i.e. the sum of all wages workers re-
ceive, less total retraining costs and government expenditures for unemployment
beneﬁts. In this calculation, I implicitly assume that the expenditures are ﬁnanced
through lump sum taxation and are thus not distortionary. Since the parameter ¿
is for calibration purposes only, I use data from the U.S. Department of Education
and the Census Bureau to estimate the average cost of retraining. According to
the Department of Education, the average per student cost of attending a two year
institution, including tuition, room and board, was $6,238 for the academic year
2002-2003. The Census Bureau reports mean income for men of approximately
$30,000 in 2003. Hence, one year of retraining costs roughly 20 percent of the
average annual income per worker. Total net wage income is larger in the training
economies than in the non-training economies due to higher wages associated with
higher productivity.
277 Results
In this section I present some results comparing the training and non-training
economies as well as the U.S. economy and my European calibrated version. I
ﬁrst investigate the effects that changes in enrollment have on my economies, and
then analyze how these economies are affected by an increase in economic turbu-
lence.
7.1 Changes in Enrollment
To illustrate the effects a change in enrollment has on my economies, I use the
calibrated values reported in Tables 4 and 6 and calculate steady-states for dif-
ferent levels of the calibrated tuition cost ¿. Increasing ¿ makes retraining more
expensive and thus increases the cutoff value o¤
j. With a lower percentage of un-
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Figure 2: Unemployment Rate and Changes in Enrollment
Figures 2 and 3 show how changes in enrollment, induced by changes in ¿, affect
the unemployment rate and productivity. Figure 2 exhibits an important feature of
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Figure 3: Productivity and Changes in Enrollment
same way unemployment insurance does. An increase in enrollment is associated
with a higher probability of ﬁnding a suitable retraining program. However, as
the chance of enrolling in retraining and potentially upgrading to the higher skill
level increases, so does the value of remaining unemployed. The tremendous dif-
ference in wages between low and high skill level makes it worthwhile for workers
to spend more time in the unemployment pool to search for retraining opportuni-
ties. Similarly, a lower probability of ﬁnding good training opportunities decreases
enrollment and the unemployment rate.
Note that the European unemployment rate is much more sensitive to changes
in enrollment that in the U.S. A replacement ratio of 70 percent and total enroll-
ment of 1 percent of the labor force provide as much disincentives to unemployed
workers in Europe as a replacement ratio of roughly 80 percent without retraining.
It is then not surprising that changes in enrollment have a much stronger incentive
effect in the European economy than in the U.S. economy. A 20 percent increase
in enrollment increases unemployment by 0.6 percentage points in the U.S., but by
roughly 1.2 percentage point in Europe.
Figure 3 shows the positive relationship between enrollment and productiv-
ity. Productivity increases with enrollment for two reasons. With more workers
29enrolled in retraining, more low-skilled workers upgrade to the higher skill level,
which is associated with an increase in average productivity of 70 to 80 percent.
Furthermore, while the productivity of high-skilled workers is not affected, low-
skilled productivity increases. An increase in enrollment increases the value of
being unemployed so that low-skilled workers become more selective about what
jobs to accept. A 20 percent increase in enrollment increases productivity between
0.4 percent (Europe) and 1 percent (U.S.). The increase in U.S. productivity is
larger because retraining is a much more important channel for skill upgrade in the
U.S. due to its higher separation rate. Few workers are employed long enough to
upgrade to the higher skill level on the job.
With higher enrollment, employment decreases in both economies. A 20 per-
cent increase in enrollment decreases employment by 1.3 percent in the U.S. and
1.5 percent in Europe. Given that the population is ﬁxed at unity, higher enroll-
ment and unemployment implies lower employment. As a result, GDP decreases
between 0.3 percent (U.S.) and 1.1 percent (Europe). The composition of the work-
force in both economies also changes considerably with changes in enrollment.
Low-skilled employment decreases between 6.3 percent (Europe) and 9.3 percent
(U.S.). High-skilled employment changes little in the European economy by in-
creases by 1.4 percent in the U.S. economy.
Withincreasesinenrollment, totalnetwageincomedecreasesinbotheconomies
for the same reasons as GDP. With changes in the composition and rate of unem-
ployment, the cost of providing unemployment beneﬁts increase between 5.1 per-
cent (U.S.) and 12.5 percent (Europe). Higher enrollment rates increase the cost
of providing retraining between 24 percent (U.S.) and 27 percent (Europe). As a
result, total net wage income decreases between 1.4 percent (U.S.) and 2.6 percent
(Europe).
This analysis points out an important feature of how I model retraining. My
model introduces an additional search friction: workers not only search for jobs
but also for suitable retraining opportunities. Changes in the availability of these
opportunities have strong effects on workers’ incentives, very similar to changes
in unemployment beneﬁts. My results would change if workers could ﬁnd suitable
training programs instantaneously without having to search for them. In that case,
thepresenceofretrainingopportunitieswouldnotchangeincentivesforlow-skilled
workers to ﬁnd employment.
7.2 Changes in Economic Turbulence
An increase in economic turbulence has a devastating effect on the welfare state in
Ljungqvist and Sargent’s (1998) model. I showed in Section 5 that their result is
not very robust to different calibrations of a DMP matching model. In this section
30I show that the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts does not matter much, even























































With Training Without Training Total Enrollment
Figure 4: Changes in Unemployment Rates and Enrollment, U.S.
Figures 4 and 5 show the impact of an increase in the turbulence parameter
°D on the enrollment and unemployment rates. The vertical line at °D = 0:10
marks the calibration point. The non-training economies respond to increases in
turbulence similarly to the economy described in Ljungqvist and Sargent: unem-
ployment increases more in the European economy than in the U.S. economy. In
the training economies, however, unemployment in the U.S. is essentially ﬂat and
that of the European economy decreases slightly. Enrollment in training programs
initially increases in both economies. As °D increases, the beneﬁt of being a high-
skilled worker declines because of the greater likelihood of skill loss, decreasing
the value of retraining. However, the large increase in the measure of low-skilled
unemployed workers associated with the increase in turbulence increases the pool
of potential enrollees. The measure of low-skilled workers initially increases faster
than the probability of ﬁnding a suitable training opportunity declines. Conse-
quently, enrollment increases at ﬁrst, but decreases at higher levels of turbulence.






















































With Training Without Training Total Enrollment
Figure 5: Changes in Unemployment Rates and Enrollment, Europe
ing to my model, observed an increase in enrollment in retraining programs in the
U.S. and Europe since the 1970s. Indeed, there is some evidence that U.S. enroll-
ment increased tremendously during the last three decades. See table 9 for data
from the National Center for Education Statistics. Note that this data includes all
levels of education. Also note that there are other factors that could increase en-
rollment in my model. These are: (1) an increase in the separation rate s, (2) an
increase in the replacement ratio ±, and (3) an increase in the difference between
high and low-skill productivity. While there is little evidence that separation rates
have increased since the 1970s or that the U.S. unemployment insurance system
has become more generous since then, there is reason to believe that productiv-
ity differences have been increasing. I was not able to ﬁnd comparable data for
European economies.
In the training economies, an increase in turbulence results in an increase in
the job ﬁnding rates of low-skilled workers. In Ljungqvist and Sargent, on the
other hand, an increase in turbulence induced low-skilled workers to decrease their
search efforts. In fact, those entitled to high beneﬁts almost completely stopped
looking for new jobs. This is true in my non-training economies as well, although
to a much lesser degree because of the different calibration. However, in the train-
321970 1980 1990 2000
Labor force, 30+ 48,807,000 66,239,000 85,672,000 104,261,000
Enrollment, 30+ 1,310,000 2,664,000 3,805,327 4,014,000
As % of total enrollment 15.3% 22.0% 27.5% 26.2%
As % of the labor force 2.7% 4.0% 4.4% 3.8%
Source:  National Center for Education Statistics, BLS, own calculations.
Table 9: U.S. Enrollment In Education Programs, 1970 - 2000
ing economies, this effect is reversed. The intuition is that unemployment beneﬁts
represent only one part of the value of being unemployed. Another important part
is the opportunity of ﬁnding a suitable training program and potentially upgrad-
ing to the higher skill level. With an increase in economic turbulence, the value
of retraining decreases and hence the value of being unemployed. As a result,
low-skilled workers are more eager to ﬁnd employment. On the other hand, high-
skilled workers’ incentives to ﬁnd work decrease with more economic turbulence.
A decline in the job ﬁnding rate in both the training and non-training economies is
the result.
Average productivity at the calibration point is between 4.8 (Europe) and 7.3
percent (U.S.) higher in the training economies than in the non-training economies
(see Figures 6 and 7). As economic turbulence increases, the difference in produc-
tivity also increases at ﬁrst, but decreasing at higher levels of turbulence. Note that
the difference in productivity between the training and non-training economies is
closely related to the evolution of enrollment rates.
In the European economy, an increase in turbulence has almost no effect on
the difference in average productivity. Due to the lower separation rate, most of
the skills are acquired on-the-job and the number of workers who upgrade through
training is very small. As turbulence increases, enrollment decreases, but this does
not signiﬁcantly affect the skill ratio of the training economy. As a result, the
difference in average productivity is very small.
Due to the decline in unemployment and enrollment, GDP and after tax wage
income decrease more slowly in the European training economy than in the non-
training economy. An increase in turbulence from °D = 0:10 to °D = 0:50
decreases GDP by 8.7 percent in the European training economy, but by 12 percent
in the non-training economy. In the U.S., GDP and after tax wage income also
decline faster in the non-training economies. This is due to an increase in the
unemployment rate between the training and the non-training economy.
In my model, an increase in economic turbulence has a much different effect

































Average Productivity GDP After Tax Wage Income
Figure 6: Differences in Average Productivity, GDP and Net Wage Income (Train-
ing vs. Non-Training Economy), U.S.
While the European unemployment rate in their model increases signiﬁcantly with
an increase in turbulence, the unemployment rate in my model declines slightly.
While in Ljungqvist and Sargent the incentives of unemployed workers were only
inﬂuenced by the unemployment replacement ratio and the degree of turbulence,
the incentive of workers in my model are also inﬂuenced by the availability of re-
training opportunities. As turbulence increases, the probability of ﬁnding a suitable
training opportunity decreases and with it the incentive to remain unemployed. As
a result, job ﬁnding rates for low-skilled workers increase with increases in turbu-
lence - very much the opposite from the model without retraining. An increase in
job ﬁnding rates, however, implies a decrease in the unemployment rate.
Figures 4 and 5 show the response of unemployment to increases in turbulence
in economies with and without retraining. In my model, every low-skilled worker
has a chance to ﬁnd a suitable retraining opportunity. This would be an example of
am economy with extremely ﬂexible training institutions. However, it is not hard to
imagine that there are no retaining opportunities for some workers. There could be
several reasons for this, some of which include geography and previous education




































Average Productivity GDP After Tax Wage Income
Figure 7: Differences in Average Productivity, GDP and Net Wage Income (Train-
ing vs. Non-Training Economy), Europe
workers, the response of unemployment to economic turbulence would be worse
thaninmymodelwithretraining, butbetterthaninmymodelwithoutretraining. In
this sense, economies with more ﬂexible training institutions perform better in the
presence of economic turbulence than economies with no training opportunities.
8 Conclusion
In this paper I explored to what degree differences in retraining opportunities are
responsible for the divergence of unemployment rates between the U.S. and Eu-
rope. In my model, an increase in training opportunities for low-skilled work-
ers increases productivity, but it also increases unemployment. The reason is that
workers have to search for suitable training programs. Increasing the probability of
ﬁnding retraining opportunities increases the value of remaining unemployed and
thus reduces the job ﬁnding rate, which leads to an increase in the unemployment
rate.
Economic turbulence decreases the value of retraining and thus the value of
being unemployed. The result is a decrease in the unemployment rate. Ljungqvist
35and Sargent pointed out a promising channel to explain the divergence of unem-
ployment rates between Europe and the U.S. since the early 1980s. As I showed in
Section 5, their result is not very robust to changes in their parametrization. Fur-
thermore, I show that the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts, the main driving
forceintheirmodel, isnotanimportantdeterminantofunemployment, evenduring
tumultuous economic times, if sufﬁciently good retraining institutions are avail-
able.
My results suggest that retraining might be important in two ways. Giving
unemployed workers the opportunity to upgrade their skills increases productivity,
but also changes their incentive structure. Of course, my result depend much on
the fact that only unemployed workers are allow to retrain. Allowing low-skilled
employed workers to retrain as well might alter my results.
Further research should investigate the importance of general versus speciﬁc
training. As Krueger and Kumar (2004) argue, European economies rely much
more heavily on vocational, or speciﬁc skill education, while the U.S. economy re-
lies more on general skill acquisition. This might play an important role in explain-
ing the different evolution of unemployment rates between the U.S. and Europe.
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data and provide deﬁnitions for the OECD classiﬁcation of education levels.
A.1 Calculating Separation Rates
I calculated the job-ﬁnding and separation rates from OECD data on average un-
employment durations. Using average duration data might introduce two biases
if the average is calculated using interrupted unemployment spells. These biases
stem from (1) counting unemployment spells not yet completed and (2) undersam-
pling short completed unemployment spells. While these are well-known problems
with the U.S. duration data, it is not clear that the same issues apply to data from
other countries presented in the table. I disregard these differences and adjust all
data for these biases by calculating the job ﬁnding rate as 2/(average duration of
unemployment). I then assume that the economies were in a steady-state in which




Knowing f, the job ﬁnding rate, and u, the aggregate unemployment rate, I can





While this yields a relative accurate estimate for the U.S., it is probably an upper
bound for all other countries.
A.2 OECD Education Categories
Upper Secondary: Upper secondary education may either be preparatory, i.e.
preparing students for tertiary education or terminal, i.e. preparing the students
for entry directly into working life .
Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary: Post-secondary non-tertiary educational pro-
grammes straddle the boundary between upper secondary and post-secondary ed-
ucation from an international point of view, even though they might clearly be
considered upper secondary or post-secondary programmes in a national context.
Although their content may not be signiﬁcantly more advanced than upper sec-
ondary programmes, they serve to broaden the knowledge of participants who have
already gained an upper secondary qualiﬁcation. The students tend to be older than
those enrolled at the upper secondary level.
40Tertiary A: Tertiary-type A programmes are largely theory-based and are de-
signedtoprovidesufﬁcientqualiﬁcationsforentrytoadvancedresearchprogrammes
and professions with high skill requirements, such as medicine, dentistry or ar-
chitecture. Tertiary-type A programmes have a minimum cumulative theoretical
duration (at tertiary level) of three years’ full-time equivalent, although they typ-
ically last four or more years. These programmes are not exclusively offered at
universities. Conversely, not all programmes nationally recognized as university
programmes fulﬁl the criteria to be classiﬁed as tertiary-type A. Tertiary-type A
programmes include second degree programmes like the American Master. First
and second programmes are sub-classiﬁed by the cumulative duration of the pro-
grammes, i.e. the total study time needed at the tertiary level to complete the
degree.
Tertiary B: Tertiary-type B programmes are typically shorter than those of
tertiary-type A and focus on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct
entryintothelabourmarket, althoughsometheoreticalfoundationsmaybecovered
in the respective programmes. They have a minimum duration of two years full-
time equivalent at the tertiary level.
Source: OECD
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